Jeremy Giffon - The Billion Dollar PDF - [Invest Like the Best, EP.481]

“One way that you can look at this is we were really in the late innings in, let's call it, 2016, 2017 on of, okay, returns in venture capital have been very high, and now we've seen whatever, 20 years of venture returns being very good. And so logically, capital is going to flow into the asset class. The problem is that the venture market is largely constrained in that the amount of great businesses that are started is relatively fixed. Probably, I believe, downstream of how many great founders there are. I think there's just a finite amount. More and more capital flows into venture. There's basically a finite amount of companies so you have to put more money into the same amount of companies. This was becoming a real problem before AI and COVID, which was that there's only so much money that you can cram into a B2B software business. And especially when annoyingly the companies are getting cheaper and cheaper to start functionally. What you saw and what you still see to some extent, but what you really saw was that all this capital was just flowing to landowners and to compensation packages, basically. Capital hates getting blocked. It's like water, it wants to find the most efficient path and it was getting blocked because it wanted to flow into venture because there was backward-looking higher returns. It was just constrained. You can only cram so much money into these companies and it was a lot of what inspired me to start my fund was seeing this problem, which was just that the amount of money these companies are raising is unrelated to the amount of money they need. Almost as if deus ex machina, all of a sudden there was two great categories that could just soak up this capital. And I really do believe in some sense that the, like, businesses and assets are sponges for capital. And that the excess— in an era of, back then we had negative interest rates and stuff, the capital has to go somewhere. And if it has nowhere to go, it will create somewhere for it to go. And I think that there's a very fortuitous arising of these high capex businesses of AI, the ultimate high capex project, obviously all the hardware stuff. And so I think in some sense, like, you could say that the capital markets were desperately looking for a place to go. To put the capital and there was no place. And so these companies almost got created downstream of capital, which I think is a little bit different of the narrative than most people would look at. So that's sort of the philosophical view. The economic view, part of the reason SaaS is getting punished so much today in the market is because it was this idea of you're selling a copy of a string. Fundamentally, that's what a software product is. And the marginal copy of a string is very close to zero. And so with zero marginal cost, The thing that you're selling should be highly profitable. The vision of that was that you will have high upfront costs and then you will have very high gross margins and hopefully one day very high net margins, although the net margins seem to never sort of materialize until private equity gets their hands on things and sort of forces that margin out. That era is largely just a downstream coincidence of this, like selling strings. And now I think we're in an era where we're selling compute and selling compute you can't write the prompt once and then sell copies of the output. You have to do the compute every single time. And so the marginal cost obviously is not zero. And I think this is like a fundamental huge change to the software business. And I think it means that this era of high gross margins being the norm is just going to go away. And what's going to make up for it, I think, is lower gross margins, much thinner net margins, and much more scale. And I think that's sort of what you're seeing, which is that the capital is flowing to the top-end provider of the scale. It would've been unthinkable that we talk about companies in $3 to $4 trillion market caps 10 years ago. Big part of that is inflation, I believe. Another part of that is just the scale dynamic, which I think it's uncontroversial to say we're going to have $10 trillion companies and so on and so forth. Because margins are going to drop, all the returns are going to accrue to scale because obviously low margin, low scale is not a very good business. To put it crudely, a bit of a Walmart effect in software, which is that the future looks like low gross margins, razor-thin net margins, huge scale. And this is probably a problem if the SaaS provider is the mom-and-pop shop, like Walmart's coming to town.”

“One way that you can look at this is we were really in the late innings in, let's call it, 2016, 2017 on of, okay, returns in venture capital have been very high, and now we've seen whatever, 20 years of venture returns being very good. And so logically, capital is going to flow into the asset class. The problem is that the venture market is largely constrained in that the amount of great businesses that are started is relatively fixed. Probably, I believe, downstream of how many great founders there are. I think there's just a finite amount. More and more capital flows into venture. There's basically a finite amount of companies so you have to put more money into the same amount of companies. This was becoming a real problem before AI and COVID, which was that there's only so much money that you can cram into a B2B software business. And especially when annoyingly the companies are getting cheaper and cheaper to start functionally. What you saw and what you still see to some extent, but what you really saw was that all this capital was just flowing to landowners and to compensation packages, basically. Capital hates getting blocked. It's like water, it wants to find the most efficient path and it was getting blocked because it wanted to flow into venture because there was backward-looking higher returns. It was just constrained. You can only cram so much money into these companies and it was a lot of what inspired me to start my fund was seeing this problem, which was just that the amount of money these companies are raising is unrelated to the amount of money they need. Almost as if deus ex machina, all of a sudden there was two great categories that could just soak up this capital. And I really do believe in some sense that the, like, businesses and assets are sponges for capital. And that the excess— in an era of, back then we had negative interest rates and stuff, the capital has to go somewhere. And if it has nowhere to go, it will create somewhere for it to go. And I think that there's a very fortuitous arising of these high capex businesses of AI, the ultimate high capex project, obviously all the hardware stuff. And so I think in some sense, like, you could say that the capital markets were desperately looking for a place to go. To put the capital and there was no place. And so these companies almost got created downstream of capital, which I think is a little bit different of the narrative than most people would look at. So that's sort of the philosophical view. The economic view, part of the reason SaaS is getting punished so much today in the market is because it was this idea of you're selling a copy of a string. Fundamentally, that's what a software product is. And the marginal copy of a string is very close to zero. And so with zero marginal cost, The thing that you're selling should be highly profitable. The vision of that was that you will have high upfront costs and then you will have very high gross margins and hopefully one day very high net margins, although the net margins seem to never sort of materialize until private equity gets their hands on things and sort of forces that margin out. That era is largely just a downstream coincidence of this, like selling strings. And now I think we're in an era where we're selling compute and selling compute you can't write the prompt once and then sell copies of the output. You have to do the compute every single time. And so the marginal cost obviously is not zero. And I think this is like a fundamental huge change to the software business. And I think it means that this era of high gross margins being the norm is just going to go away. And what's going to make up for it, I think, is lower gross margins, much thinner net margins, and much more scale. And I think that's sort of what you're seeing, which is that the capital is flowing to the top-end provider of the scale. It would've been unthinkable that we talk about companies in $3 to $4 trillion market caps 10 years ago. Big part of that is inflation, I believe. Another part of that is just the scale dynamic, which I think it's uncontroversial to say we're going to have $10 trillion companies and so on and so forth. Because margins are going to drop, all the returns are going to accrue to scale because obviously low margin, low scale is not a very good business. To put it crudely, a bit of a Walmart effect in software, which is that the future looks like low gross margins, razor-thin net margins, huge scale. And this is probably a problem if the SaaS provider is the mom-and-pop shop, like Walmart's coming to town.”

“We're very fortunate to have such a wide mandate and sort of what we can do and look at. Maybe the only consensus view is the niche sort of apocalyptic vision at some of the core zealots at the labs. But outside of that, I think it's really sort of a jump ball. Markets lack a lot of nuance. SaaS is a business model of this idea that you pay usually per person, per month or per year for access to a tool that helps you use your computer. I think in that sense, SaaS is in a lot of trouble, but I don't think for a lot of these businesses that are being really sold off today out of fear that that is actually what is important to the business at all. It is actually interesting to me. I wrote a post recently about the idea that a public manager being long the Mag 7 is, without taking a specific view on the trade, probably like good capital allocation because sometimes you just got to do the really obvious thing and just follow consensus because consensus is Usually, right? One of the pushbacks that I got to that is, well, these things, you know, they're the biggest companies in the world, they're priced to perfection. I think it's underrated the fact that the 52-week variance on these things is like nearly 100% for the biggest companies in the world. And so they're not priced well at all, and the market lacks extreme nuance. I think it goes back to what we were talking about, which is probably someone smarter than me could draw out a much clearer picture, but there's something to do with passive flows and the marginal price of security. And what's informing the marginal price of securities is the posts in the group chats that the random people are writing, that the algorithm's chosen. In this way, the algorithm, the AI, frankly, my understanding is that's what's driving most of the algorithms now on Twitter and YouTube is pricing the market in some very real sense because it's choosing the narrative that it wants to show to people. And then those people are pricing off that. It's another lesson, which is markets are not efficient. There's no nuance. That would be the big thing that we're seeing today. I think there's a lot of delusion in either direction. The most honest thing for a lot of managers to do would be to sit it out, but they're structurally unable or unwilling to do that. And so you just sort of, you know, hope for the best and put capital out the door, and it's sort of a problem for tomorrow. A lot of things are still getting priced irrationally in the private markets in ways that are totally unrelated to the quality of the business, but are more of a function of just the incentive structures of the funds.”

“You mentioned the SaaS is just a model and there's good and there's bad. What do you think about this trend of super capex-heavy, token-heavy, real-world asset? There's this new genre of company that seems to have emerged as really dominant. I was looking the other day, I was curious in our portfolio what percent was not pure bits, and it's like 60-something percent is not just software based on the market value of our investments. I was surprised by that. Like, it's a really high percentage, whereas VCs have mostly historically been all software for the last 10 or 15 years. What do you make of this trend, this class of business, lower gross margins, things like this?”

“I don't think one's better than the other. There's truth to the caricature, which is East Coast is extractive, pessimistic, downside-oriented. West Coast is naive, unsophisticated. That is true to some obvious extent, and I think they're merging now. It's no coincidence that the West Coast is definitely eating the East Coast. Venture capital has created the biggest businesses in the world, and private equity has not. And where private equity has, it's largely been through acquisition and financial engineering. And so it's sort of inarguable that venture capital is this sort of much better force for the world. It's a tiny little asset class that has produced all the most important things in the world. It's also this civilizational technology, which is you're willing to give young people millions of dollars to try a very speculative idea with basically no retribution or downside if it doesn't work. So it's clearly this amazing force. I think there's been a very interesting, like, flip in compensation between East and West. And so When I was growing up, my understanding was that Wall Street is where you would get paid huge amounts of cash on a yearly basis. You would have no enduring equity value, but you would get paid a lot of liquid cash. And the West Coast was this idea where you would be rich on paper. You would have equity that would maybe be this enormous payoff in some distant future. And I would argue that those have started to flip now, whereas like Wall Street, because all these businesses have gone public, you know, on Wall Street you're comped on RSUs and you're thinking like a firm and you're, less worried about the carry in any one fund and you're more worried about the stock price and performance of the firm as a whole. And interestingly, in Silicon Valley, it's almost moved towards an annual cash basis. But given how these markets, you know, companies staying private creates these sort of mature secondary markets that sort of de facto yearly tenders becoming almost a parallel liquid marketplace. You're actually paid huge amounts of cash in Silicon Valley. And I think we've seen that with the AI stuff and even, you know, venture capital firms getting acquired and GPs leaving their firms. And all this sort of stuff where it actually is becoming more liquid, more mercenary. I'm always interested in these structural shifts and how that starts to change things where the Valley is a place where you're liquid and you're getting cash out yearly and you're jumping from firm to firm. And Wall Street is a place where you have a bunch of RSUs and you're sort of thinking more about the long term and the enterprise value of the firm.”

“There is this funny notion that it's sort of specific to the labs, but it's a broader thing as well, I suppose. We're sort of recreating the feudal system from first principles where there are the lords, Elon, Zuckerberg, Dario, Sam. They can sort of make landed gentry by giving out allocations because these allocations are sort of these best example of generational wealth. You get this allocation in SpaceX or in Waymo or whatever, you get to charge huge fees on it. And it's sort of this like wholly synthetic product, which is someone gives you a sort of arbitrary number. They know you don't have the money, so they know you're going to go fill it. And then you get to go out and basically say, I've been given a deed. The king has given me 500 acres in this country and Elon has given me $100 million to allocate in SpaceX. Then you get to go out and charge fees and make a bunch of money from it. Do you have allocation? And I guess I'm interested in it because it's sort of this purely relational, wholly synthetic thing that I'm not sure has ever existed before. Certainly not at the scale and magnitude. You can go due to your relationship, basically get this like landed estate and then take it to a sovereign or a foundation and they will pay you for that access, like a pure paid for access. But maybe where it's different is that's just brokering. But the difference is obviously that brokering is sort of like a one-time transaction, but these allocations sort of, you know, they live on forever.”

“No GP commit, 10% one-time upfront fee with some carry structure generally, where you're just demanding basically that you get paid life-changing amounts of money with zero risk, and then you also get a huge amount of upside. The other thing is I've seen a few that don't have a term limit. I know there was like famously some, a lot of SpaceX ones, I think people were doing that 10 years ago. I know there's certainly some that just collect the fee forever. To capital's credit, you're very happy to be paying that 2% on the SpaceX thing that you did 15 years ago. So it's sort of a win-win. It's not to say these are all bad. It's just, it's sort of funny because it's not investing. It's not strictly brokering. It's this very different thing that is like a wholly insider access game. And then of course there's all the fraud and bad behavior that I think comes with all the bubble and stuff.”

“You really realize in, let's say, long-term private markets that the great filter for funds is their storytelling ability, fundamentally because their product, which is realized cash returns, take a decade. The thing that you're selling in the interim, whether it's through, you know, a quarterly update or your event or just your one-on-one conversations with your LPs, is really just narrative. A particular situation that's very interesting that we've seen a lot of is companies where twofold. One is that the business is kind of old, but it has started to do well recently. That's an interesting scenario because it's one of these instances where merely because the company, the story, again, the narrative of the company is that it's 7 years old. Let's say the company has really started to inflect. Maybe it's because of AI or maybe it's because of something else, but they're 6 or 7 years into their life. It's very difficult for those companies to get funding because the story is, well, okay, fine, you grew 200% last year. In absolute terms, you're only at $8 million of revenue and you're 7 years in. Whereas I think literally if you just change the name and told a different story and just sort of arbitrarily started the clock 2 years ago, that company would actually be like really hot. That's an interesting situation. The fix I think is just to be more flexible on narrative and story. Derivative of that problem is just the amount of businesses where they're in a spot where it's kind of working, things are starting to go well, but they're faced with 3 choices, which is basically they're not going to raise a significant up round. Really, they're staring down a bridge round, strategic like M&A, acquihire, or cutting to profitability. And those are just really hard situations. If you're in that situation, I think that's where you really want to get creative with the cap table. If you have some cash, buy back your investors, convert everyone to common, really start to spend more time on the cap table because otherwise I've been shocked at sort of how hostile insider bridge rounds really are. I think this is like an underdiscussed part of venture. Also just they have 3x liquidation preferences or warrants or ratchets or other things. If you're extractive to the downside, everyone sort of boos you. But if you're extractive for the upside where you say, I want the right to invest at the same price in 2 years from now, they're both like similarly extractive, but because one is like an optimistic extractive, everyone loves that one.”

“I get asked a lot by LPs where they should put their money, what managers are good, or should they invest in this fund. You have to take a somewhat cynical view of these things as— and maybe it's not actually cynical, just maybe the more realist view of these are businesses first and, you know, their product which is returns, but like they're a business. You have to recognize what sort of customer you are. The question of where should I put my $500 grand check? You probably shouldn't put it into like marginal $5 billion growth fund, but I actually get asked that a lot. Should I put some $1 or $2 million into this fund? It's probably going to be a good fund, but could you find something much better to do with that million dollars? Probably. It sounds obvious, but in reality it's not. And I think what people don't understand is that basically if you're a principal, let's say if you're a principal that can't write like sovereign or institution-sized checks, you're a totally different customer and the businesses are not designed to serve you as a customer. The growth fund is probably a great place if you have to park $100 million somewhere. It's probably a very, very good place, but it's not a good place to park like a $500 grand check. If your business is set up to service sovereigns and large endowments and stuff, your product is just so different from what you're going to serve for someone smaller. And this gets into the like, well, okay, if you have a small check, what do you do? And I think this is where the emerging manager stuff is really underrated and looking for places where the manager is actually most tightly aligned to returns, either because returns are critical to future funds or that's actually how they're going to make all their money.”

“You really realize in, let's say, long-term private markets that the great filter for funds is their storytelling ability, fundamentally because their product, which is realized cash returns, take a decade. The thing that you're selling in the interim, whether it's through, you know, a quarterly update or your event or just your one-on-one conversations with your LPs, is really just narrative. A particular situation that's very interesting that we've seen a lot of is companies where twofold. One is that the business is kind of old, but it has started to do well recently. That's an interesting scenario because it's one of these instances where merely because the company, the story, again, the narrative of the company is that it's 7 years old. Let's say the company has really started to inflect. Maybe it's because of AI or maybe it's because of something else, but they're 6 or 7 years into their life. It's very difficult for those companies to get funding because the story is, well, okay, fine, you grew 200% last year. In absolute terms, you're only at $8 million of revenue and you're 7 years in. Whereas I think literally if you just change the name and told a different story and just sort of arbitrarily started the clock 2 years ago, that company would actually be like really hot. That's an interesting situation. The fix I think is just to be more flexible on narrative and story. Derivative of that problem is just the amount of businesses where they're in a spot where it's kind of working, things are starting to go well, but they're faced with 3 choices, which is basically they're not going to raise a significant up round. Really, they're staring down a bridge round, strategic like M&A, acquihire, or cutting to profitability. And those are just really hard situations. If you're in that situation, I think that's where you really want to get creative with the cap table. If you have some cash, buy back your investors, convert everyone to common, really start to spend more time on the cap table because otherwise I've been shocked at sort of how hostile insider bridge rounds really are. I think this is like an underdiscussed part of venture. Also just they have 3x liquidation preferences or warrants or ratchets or other things. If you're extractive to the downside, everyone sort of boos you. But if you're extractive for the upside where you say, I want the right to invest at the same price in 2 years from now, they're both like similarly extractive, but because one is like an optimistic extractive, everyone loves that one.”

“You really realize in, let's say, long-term private markets that the great filter for funds is their storytelling ability, fundamentally because their product, which is realized cash returns, take a decade. The thing that you're selling in the interim, whether it's through, you know, a quarterly update or your event or just your one-on-one conversations with your LPs, is really just narrative. A particular situation that's very interesting that we've seen a lot of is companies where twofold. One is that the business is kind of old, but it has started to do well recently. That's an interesting scenario because it's one of these instances where merely because the company, the story, again, the narrative of the company is that it's 7 years old. Let's say the company has really started to inflect. Maybe it's because of AI or maybe it's because of something else, but they're 6 or 7 years into their life. It's very difficult for those companies to get funding because the story is, well, okay, fine, you grew 200% last year. In absolute terms, you're only at $8 million of revenue and you're 7 years in. Whereas I think literally if you just change the name and told a different story and just sort of arbitrarily started the clock 2 years ago, that company would actually be like really hot. That's an interesting situation. The fix I think is just to be more flexible on narrative and story. Derivative of that problem is just the amount of businesses where they're in a spot where it's kind of working, things are starting to go well, but they're faced with 3 choices, which is basically they're not going to raise a significant up round. Really, they're staring down a bridge round, strategic like M&A, acquihire, or cutting to profitability. And those are just really hard situations. If you're in that situation, I think that's where you really want to get creative with the cap table. If you have some cash, buy back your investors, convert everyone to common, really start to spend more time on the cap table because otherwise I've been shocked at sort of how hostile insider bridge rounds really are. I think this is like an underdiscussed part of venture. Also just they have 3x liquidation preferences or warrants or ratchets or other things. If you're extractive to the downside, everyone sort of boos you. But if you're extractive for the upside where you say, I want the right to invest at the same price in 2 years from now, they're both like similarly extractive, but because one is like an optimistic extractive, everyone loves that one.”

“This is sort of an idea that you and I came up with in a joking way that turned out to be true. I think the more we thought about it, which is every once in a while someone basically crystallizes a notion right at the right time in the right way that becomes the foundational viewpoint or opinion on certain era. And I think it's just this idea of everyone's a little bit uncertain. They don't know what's going on and someone just needs to set the story and set the narrative and it doesn't even have to be right, but there's just a sort of confidence of this is what's going on. This is happening. When those come together, they sort of just set a new narrative that everyone can kind of rest on for a period, really, until the next PDF comes along. And the billion-dollar PDF thing is this idea that you can form billions of dollars of capital one way or another around simply setting a new idea. And then maybe you can think of capital as 10-year-olds playing soccer. They all sort of just follow the ball around. The capital just follows the billion-dollar PDF around the field.”

“One way that you can look at this is we were really in the late innings in, let's call it, 2016, 2017 on of, okay, returns in venture capital have been very high, and now we've seen whatever, 20 years of venture returns being very good. And so logically, capital is going to flow into the asset class. The problem is that the venture market is largely constrained in that the amount of great businesses that are started is relatively fixed. Probably, I believe, downstream of how many great founders there are. I think there's just a finite amount. More and more capital flows into venture. There's basically a finite amount of companies so you have to put more money into the same amount of companies. This was becoming a real problem before AI and COVID, which was that there's only so much money that you can cram into a B2B software business. And especially when annoyingly the companies are getting cheaper and cheaper to start functionally. What you saw and what you still see to some extent, but what you really saw was that all this capital was just flowing to landowners and to compensation packages, basically. Capital hates getting blocked. It's like water, it wants to find the most efficient path and it was getting blocked because it wanted to flow into venture because there was backward-looking higher returns. It was just constrained. You can only cram so much money into these companies and it was a lot of what inspired me to start my fund was seeing this problem, which was just that the amount of money these companies are raising is unrelated to the amount of money they need. Almost as if deus ex machina, all of a sudden there was two great categories that could just soak up this capital. And I really do believe in some sense that the, like, businesses and assets are sponges for capital. And that the excess— in an era of, back then we had negative interest rates and stuff, the capital has to go somewhere. And if it has nowhere to go, it will create somewhere for it to go. And I think that there's a very fortuitous arising of these high capex businesses of AI, the ultimate high capex project, obviously all the hardware stuff. And so I think in some sense, like, you could say that the capital markets were desperately looking for a place to go. To put the capital and there was no place. And so these companies almost got created downstream of capital, which I think is a little bit different of the narrative than most people would look at. So that's sort of the philosophical view. The economic view, part of the reason SaaS is getting punished so much today in the market is because it was this idea of you're selling a copy of a string. Fundamentally, that's what a software product is. And the marginal copy of a string is very close to zero. And so with zero marginal cost, The thing that you're selling should be highly profitable. The vision of that was that you will have high upfront costs and then you will have very high gross margins and hopefully one day very high net margins, although the net margins seem to never sort of materialize until private equity gets their hands on things and sort of forces that margin out. That era is largely just a downstream coincidence of this, like selling strings. And now I think we're in an era where we're selling compute and selling compute you can't write the prompt once and then sell copies of the output. You have to do the compute every single time. And so the marginal cost obviously is not zero. And I think this is like a fundamental huge change to the software business. And I think it means that this era of high gross margins being the norm is just going to go away. And what's going to make up for it, I think, is lower gross margins, much thinner net margins, and much more scale. And I think that's sort of what you're seeing, which is that the capital is flowing to the top-end provider of the scale. It would've been unthinkable that we talk about companies in $3 to $4 trillion market caps 10 years ago. Big part of that is inflation, I believe. Another part of that is just the scale dynamic, which I think it's uncontroversial to say we're going to have $10 trillion companies and so on and so forth. Because margins are going to drop, all the returns are going to accrue to scale because obviously low margin, low scale is not a very good business. To put it crudely, a bit of a Walmart effect in software, which is that the future looks like low gross margins, razor-thin net margins, huge scale. And this is probably a problem if the SaaS provider is the mom-and-pop shop, like Walmart's coming to town.”

“The short to medium-term prognosis is hard to speculate on and could very well be bad. A friend of mine, he has kids in college and he has a 10-year-old and he's very worried about the kids in college, but not the 10-year-old. And I think that is directionally correct. Maybe from the 10-year-old's perspective, look, I think it's great. I think first of all, Anything that can be automated should be automated. I think it's really hard to argue against that when you really, really think about it. The notion to me that I might be in the last years of my life where I ever have to sit down in front of a computer and like do things with it is tremendously liberating. On the jobs thing, I don't really understand this idea of we're at peak jobs or we're going to run out of jobs. To me, it's very obvious that every white-collar job is like totally fake and made up in the sense that these are not contingent for shelter and food and medicine and other necessities. Like, I'm not talking about those, but most jobs do not touch those, or if they do, they touch it in a very, very derivative way. What is your job as an allocator? Well, because capital is inherently inflationary, you can't just leave it alone. This is one of like the great, maybe evils of money is that once you get it, you can't just leave it alone because then it goes away. So you have to do something with it. And this creates this entire whole thing. My job is when you have money and you don't want it to go away, you have to give it to someone. You give it to a bunch of people. I take it and I put it into things that are productive. And then hopefully you don't lose your money. You get more money. Is this useful? Is this good? Yeah, sure. It's not real and it's like fun and useful, but not in a direct way. To me, there's like unlimited amounts of jobs that you can create in those sorts of scenarios. We're going to have unlimited wants and desires, and our economy is solely driven by our unquenchable desire to consume things. So we're going to come up with new things to consume. And now again, in the short term and medium term, that might be volatile and there might be a lot of job loss and that's not good. And there could be a lot of despair. In the long run, we're just going to invent new things to do. We've already solved all of our problems. The worry about, oh, we're not going to have more jobs, it just doesn't really resonate. We just make up stuff for us to do, and that's sort of the whole point of it. And that's good. That's better than being idle. Maybe more people should be idle. There's all sorts of ways that this shows through the cracks. The work from home thing, I think, is like a strong indication of most people don't have 40 hours of work to be done. They maybe have 40 hours of meetings to sit in, or they have 40 hours that they have to be on standby. Work from home, I think, wouldn't be that important. Let's imagine a version where you work on a factory line and you can set up the microcosm of the factory in your backyard., but you still got to be on the line 10 hours a day. Yeah, I guess work from home, maybe you can have lunch at home. You don't have a commute anymore, but it's not like this huge improvement. The reason people are so attached to work from home is because they actually have like 2 or 3 hours of work to do per day. And there's a lot of your time at the office where you're just sort of like killing time. Yeah. And so work from home Fridays is a soft launch of the 4-day work week. And I think this is all fine. The fact that we can continue paying people to work from home and work 4 days a week is just a sign that we need less labor time out of people than we used to, and we're still able be just as productive.”

“I think it's downstream of technological change. I think the technological change is really the unifeed. What people don't appreciate about X is that everyone gets served the same 500 tweets per day. There's hundreds of millions of daily active users. And the thing that people who don't post don't realize is just the poster-to-lurker ratio on these things is enormous. It's really hard to feel the impact unless you're actually getting onto the feed and seeing all the people that you didn't know were reading X all day commenting on your thing. I'm always surprised, like when I post a good tweet, whoever texts me about it, it could be someone I know well and I had no idea that they read Twitter all day, but everyone reads Twitter all day. So the unifeed, I think, is sort of the technological catalyst for this phenomenon. It is X, by the way. It's interesting how X, it's sort of the Lindy social network. It probably is never going to reach the scale of the others. But it just fills this vital role. And it's interesting to me how it's however long in, probably almost 20 years now, and it's still more important than ever, sort of the same source of truth almost for the whole world. And what that means is that everyone is reading the same thing. It's the global newspaper in the same way that people would talk about the latest article in the Journal 30 years ago. Now it's the latest tweet or the latest essay on X. What that creates is that all the most important people in the world, at least when it comes to capital markets and politics and journalism, entrepreneurship, they're reading their daily paper every morning. These things really form opinion and they price securities and they dictate where capital flows and they certainly write policy. There's this idea that another great filter perhaps is that your institution will only survive if it's timeline native. And what that means is that it is both reactive to and reflexive to the timeline. Reactive, meaning that it's constantly monitoring the timeline and reflexive in that its actions then affect the timeline, which it then sort of reads and reacts to. And you can think of the White House is obviously like this. Venture capital is like this. Public equities are like this. There's this idea of what is the story? And what's interesting, one of the things I get emails about the most is a comment I made somewhere about how like posting is the last great meritocracy. I get emails about that because people are like, that really clicked in my head and I started posting and posting changes your life if you're good at it. That's still true today, maybe more true than ever. And it is sort of a meritocracy in a weird way. Now there's the algorithms and AI and all this stuff. In some ways it's a lot more meritocratic than it used to be. Like everything, it's been lottery-ified. In the old times, you had to grind away and build this huge following. And then by virtue of having a big following, you could post a really inane tweet and it would be very popular, but that doesn't happen anymore. Now you can literally be like a new account and just write a good post and then the algorithm selects you and it'll display you in front of 500 million people. You have the global newspaper that everyone reads, that everyone finds highly influential. There's also this Meta thing where it's like the newspaper. If you could see all the influential people reacting to the articles in the newspaper and then by virtue of reacting to it, making the thing more important. And anyone can post to it. Gets dictated from the timeline, how much venture rounds are done on the timeline, how much businesses are built on the timeline. Increasingly, everything will just become timeline native. TPBN is a great example of this. When we're recording this, every other day someone writes some sort of pornographic fanfic about AI and it moves the public markets dramatically. When there's uncertainty, people are just looking for what is the story, what is the most compelling story. And the way that it works on the timeline is it's not this well-considered book that comes out that everyone talks about for a year. It's what is the thing that sounds smart, feels good. It has to be entertaining. Maybe that's another change is a good post has to be very entertaining because people are on the timeline to be entertained. They can lie to themselves and say they're on it for other reasons, but it's just to be entertained. That's obviously what the algorithms are selecting for. There's this idea that the most entertaining, novel, somewhat interesting somewhat correct thing is going to set the actions and the consensus for everyone on a day-to-day basis. And this translates into their actions.”

“I think it's downstream of technological change. I think the technological change is really the unifeed. What people don't appreciate about X is that everyone gets served the same 500 tweets per day. There's hundreds of millions of daily active users. And the thing that people who don't post don't realize is just the poster-to-lurker ratio on these things is enormous. It's really hard to feel the impact unless you're actually getting onto the feed and seeing all the people that you didn't know were reading X all day commenting on your thing. I'm always surprised, like when I post a good tweet, whoever texts me about it, it could be someone I know well and I had no idea that they read Twitter all day, but everyone reads Twitter all day. So the unifeed, I think, is sort of the technological catalyst for this phenomenon. It is X, by the way. It's interesting how X, it's sort of the Lindy social network. It probably is never going to reach the scale of the others. But it just fills this vital role. And it's interesting to me how it's however long in, probably almost 20 years now, and it's still more important than ever, sort of the same source of truth almost for the whole world. And what that means is that everyone is reading the same thing. It's the global newspaper in the same way that people would talk about the latest article in the Journal 30 years ago. Now it's the latest tweet or the latest essay on X. What that creates is that all the most important people in the world, at least when it comes to capital markets and politics and journalism, entrepreneurship, they're reading their daily paper every morning. These things really form opinion and they price securities and they dictate where capital flows and they certainly write policy. There's this idea that another great filter perhaps is that your institution will only survive if it's timeline native. And what that means is that it is both reactive to and reflexive to the timeline. Reactive, meaning that it's constantly monitoring the timeline and reflexive in that its actions then affect the timeline, which it then sort of reads and reacts to. And you can think of the White House is obviously like this. Venture capital is like this. Public equities are like this. There's this idea of what is the story? And what's interesting, one of the things I get emails about the most is a comment I made somewhere about how like posting is the last great meritocracy. I get emails about that because people are like, that really clicked in my head and I started posting and posting changes your life if you're good at it. That's still true today, maybe more true than ever. And it is sort of a meritocracy in a weird way. Now there's the algorithms and AI and all this stuff. In some ways it's a lot more meritocratic than it used to be. Like everything, it's been lottery-ified. In the old times, you had to grind away and build this huge following. And then by virtue of having a big following, you could post a really inane tweet and it would be very popular, but that doesn't happen anymore. Now you can literally be like a new account and just write a good post and then the algorithm selects you and it'll display you in front of 500 million people. You have the global newspaper that everyone reads, that everyone finds highly influential. There's also this Meta thing where it's like the newspaper. If you could see all the influential people reacting to the articles in the newspaper and then by virtue of reacting to it, making the thing more important. And anyone can post to it. Gets dictated from the timeline, how much venture rounds are done on the timeline, how much businesses are built on the timeline. Increasingly, everything will just become timeline native. TPBN is a great example of this. When we're recording this, every other day someone writes some sort of pornographic fanfic about AI and it moves the public markets dramatically. When there's uncertainty, people are just looking for what is the story, what is the most compelling story. And the way that it works on the timeline is it's not this well-considered book that comes out that everyone talks about for a year. It's what is the thing that sounds smart, feels good. It has to be entertaining. Maybe that's another change is a good post has to be very entertaining because people are on the timeline to be entertained. They can lie to themselves and say they're on it for other reasons, but it's just to be entertained. That's obviously what the algorithms are selecting for. There's this idea that the most entertaining, novel, somewhat interesting somewhat correct thing is going to set the actions and the consensus for everyone on a day-to-day basis. And this translates into their actions.”

“I think it's downstream of technological change. I think the technological change is really the unifeed. What people don't appreciate about X is that everyone gets served the same 500 tweets per day. There's hundreds of millions of daily active users. And the thing that people who don't post don't realize is just the poster-to-lurker ratio on these things is enormous. It's really hard to feel the impact unless you're actually getting onto the feed and seeing all the people that you didn't know were reading X all day commenting on your thing. I'm always surprised, like when I post a good tweet, whoever texts me about it, it could be someone I know well and I had no idea that they read Twitter all day, but everyone reads Twitter all day. So the unifeed, I think, is sort of the technological catalyst for this phenomenon. It is X, by the way. It's interesting how X, it's sort of the Lindy social network. It probably is never going to reach the scale of the others. But it just fills this vital role. And it's interesting to me how it's however long in, probably almost 20 years now, and it's still more important than ever, sort of the same source of truth almost for the whole world. And what that means is that everyone is reading the same thing. It's the global newspaper in the same way that people would talk about the latest article in the Journal 30 years ago. Now it's the latest tweet or the latest essay on X. What that creates is that all the most important people in the world, at least when it comes to capital markets and politics and journalism, entrepreneurship, they're reading their daily paper every morning. These things really form opinion and they price securities and they dictate where capital flows and they certainly write policy. There's this idea that another great filter perhaps is that your institution will only survive if it's timeline native. And what that means is that it is both reactive to and reflexive to the timeline. Reactive, meaning that it's constantly monitoring the timeline and reflexive in that its actions then affect the timeline, which it then sort of reads and reacts to. And you can think of the White House is obviously like this. Venture capital is like this. Public equities are like this. There's this idea of what is the story? And what's interesting, one of the things I get emails about the most is a comment I made somewhere about how like posting is the last great meritocracy. I get emails about that because people are like, that really clicked in my head and I started posting and posting changes your life if you're good at it. That's still true today, maybe more true than ever. And it is sort of a meritocracy in a weird way. Now there's the algorithms and AI and all this stuff. In some ways it's a lot more meritocratic than it used to be. Like everything, it's been lottery-ified. In the old times, you had to grind away and build this huge following. And then by virtue of having a big following, you could post a really inane tweet and it would be very popular, but that doesn't happen anymore. Now you can literally be like a new account and just write a good post and then the algorithm selects you and it'll display you in front of 500 million people. You have the global newspaper that everyone reads, that everyone finds highly influential. There's also this Meta thing where it's like the newspaper. If you could see all the influential people reacting to the articles in the newspaper and then by virtue of reacting to it, making the thing more important. And anyone can post to it. Gets dictated from the timeline, how much venture rounds are done on the timeline, how much businesses are built on the timeline. Increasingly, everything will just become timeline native. TPBN is a great example of this. When we're recording this, every other day someone writes some sort of pornographic fanfic about AI and it moves the public markets dramatically. When there's uncertainty, people are just looking for what is the story, what is the most compelling story. And the way that it works on the timeline is it's not this well-considered book that comes out that everyone talks about for a year. It's what is the thing that sounds smart, feels good. It has to be entertaining. Maybe that's another change is a good post has to be very entertaining because people are on the timeline to be entertained. They can lie to themselves and say they're on it for other reasons, but it's just to be entertained. That's obviously what the algorithms are selecting for. There's this idea that the most entertaining, novel, somewhat interesting somewhat correct thing is going to set the actions and the consensus for everyone on a day-to-day basis. And this translates into their actions.”

“It's just highly reactive and reflexive to the timeline. I think it's hyper-aware, maybe in the same way that past administrations would be addicted to polling. I think it looks more at the timeline than polling. Polling is all about understanding the wants and desires of the median, the average person. But the timeline shifts back to a more Republican model, which is that you're caring about a few hundred thousand people who are influential. Ben Sasse, the former senator, has this great notion that Washington is now mostly people who want to be TikTok and YouTube stars is like mostly what congressmen and senators want to be. He condemns it, which is true from some very simple sense, which is you would hope that congressmen and senators primarily interested in governance. But they're not. On the other hand, I think maybe a shift of this that I'm only just putting together now is polling drives governance, whereas if you're only pulling the timeline, you can sort of think about it as this is why the people who do well in politics now are just optimized for content. They're basically content creators because the polling is the timeline. And that's interesting again, because who is on the timeline? The readers is probably more of an accurate sample of the median people in the country. But the posters who are dictating what the timeline thinks of something is a really, really small group. If the original vision for who voted was white male landowners, maybe the version of people who matter for policy now are the good posters. I don't know if that's a good or bad thing, but it's certainly a very different group that I don't think correlates super tightly to any particular demographic trait necessarily.”

“I think it's downstream of technological change. I think the technological change is really the unifeed. What people don't appreciate about X is that everyone gets served the same 500 tweets per day. There's hundreds of millions of daily active users. And the thing that people who don't post don't realize is just the poster-to-lurker ratio on these things is enormous. It's really hard to feel the impact unless you're actually getting onto the feed and seeing all the people that you didn't know were reading X all day commenting on your thing. I'm always surprised, like when I post a good tweet, whoever texts me about it, it could be someone I know well and I had no idea that they read Twitter all day, but everyone reads Twitter all day. So the unifeed, I think, is sort of the technological catalyst for this phenomenon. It is X, by the way. It's interesting how X, it's sort of the Lindy social network. It probably is never going to reach the scale of the others. But it just fills this vital role. And it's interesting to me how it's however long in, probably almost 20 years now, and it's still more important than ever, sort of the same source of truth almost for the whole world. And what that means is that everyone is reading the same thing. It's the global newspaper in the same way that people would talk about the latest article in the Journal 30 years ago. Now it's the latest tweet or the latest essay on X. What that creates is that all the most important people in the world, at least when it comes to capital markets and politics and journalism, entrepreneurship, they're reading their daily paper every morning. These things really form opinion and they price securities and they dictate where capital flows and they certainly write policy. There's this idea that another great filter perhaps is that your institution will only survive if it's timeline native. And what that means is that it is both reactive to and reflexive to the timeline. Reactive, meaning that it's constantly monitoring the timeline and reflexive in that its actions then affect the timeline, which it then sort of reads and reacts to. And you can think of the White House is obviously like this. Venture capital is like this. Public equities are like this. There's this idea of what is the story? And what's interesting, one of the things I get emails about the most is a comment I made somewhere about how like posting is the last great meritocracy. I get emails about that because people are like, that really clicked in my head and I started posting and posting changes your life if you're good at it. That's still true today, maybe more true than ever. And it is sort of a meritocracy in a weird way. Now there's the algorithms and AI and all this stuff. In some ways it's a lot more meritocratic than it used to be. Like everything, it's been lottery-ified. In the old times, you had to grind away and build this huge following. And then by virtue of having a big following, you could post a really inane tweet and it would be very popular, but that doesn't happen anymore. Now you can literally be like a new account and just write a good post and then the algorithm selects you and it'll display you in front of 500 million people. You have the global newspaper that everyone reads, that everyone finds highly influential. There's also this Meta thing where it's like the newspaper. If you could see all the influential people reacting to the articles in the newspaper and then by virtue of reacting to it, making the thing more important. And anyone can post to it. Gets dictated from the timeline, how much venture rounds are done on the timeline, how much businesses are built on the timeline. Increasingly, everything will just become timeline native. TPBN is a great example of this. When we're recording this, every other day someone writes some sort of pornographic fanfic about AI and it moves the public markets dramatically. When there's uncertainty, people are just looking for what is the story, what is the most compelling story. And the way that it works on the timeline is it's not this well-considered book that comes out that everyone talks about for a year. It's what is the thing that sounds smart, feels good. It has to be entertaining. Maybe that's another change is a good post has to be very entertaining because people are on the timeline to be entertained. They can lie to themselves and say they're on it for other reasons, but it's just to be entertained. That's obviously what the algorithms are selecting for. There's this idea that the most entertaining, novel, somewhat interesting somewhat correct thing is going to set the actions and the consensus for everyone on a day-to-day basis. And this translates into their actions.”

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“I think it's downstream of technological change. I think the technological change is really the unifeed. What people don't appreciate about X is that everyone gets served the same 500 tweets per day. There's hundreds of millions of daily active users. And the thing that people who don't post don't realize is just the poster-to-lurker ratio on these things is enormous. It's really hard to feel the impact unless you're actually getting onto the feed and seeing all the people that you didn't know were reading X all day commenting on your thing. I'm always surprised, like when I post a good tweet, whoever texts me about it, it could be someone I know well and I had no idea that they read Twitter all day, but everyone reads Twitter all day. So the unifeed, I think, is sort of the technological catalyst for this phenomenon. It is X, by the way. It's interesting how X, it's sort of the Lindy social network. It probably is never going to reach the scale of the others. But it just fills this vital role. And it's interesting to me how it's however long in, probably almost 20 years now, and it's still more important than ever, sort of the same source of truth almost for the whole world. And what that means is that everyone is reading the same thing. It's the global newspaper in the same way that people would talk about the latest article in the Journal 30 years ago. Now it's the latest tweet or the latest essay on X. What that creates is that all the most important people in the world, at least when it comes to capital markets and politics and journalism, entrepreneurship, they're reading their daily paper every morning. These things really form opinion and they price securities and they dictate where capital flows and they certainly write policy. There's this idea that another great filter perhaps is that your institution will only survive if it's timeline native. And what that means is that it is both reactive to and reflexive to the timeline. Reactive, meaning that it's constantly monitoring the timeline and reflexive in that its actions then affect the timeline, which it then sort of reads and reacts to. And you can think of the White House is obviously like this. Venture capital is like this. Public equities are like this. There's this idea of what is the story? And what's interesting, one of the things I get emails about the most is a comment I made somewhere about how like posting is the last great meritocracy. I get emails about that because people are like, that really clicked in my head and I started posting and posting changes your life if you're good at it. That's still true today, maybe more true than ever. And it is sort of a meritocracy in a weird way. Now there's the algorithms and AI and all this stuff. In some ways it's a lot more meritocratic than it used to be. Like everything, it's been lottery-ified. In the old times, you had to grind away and build this huge following. And then by virtue of having a big following, you could post a really inane tweet and it would be very popular, but that doesn't happen anymore. Now you can literally be like a new account and just write a good post and then the algorithm selects you and it'll display you in front of 500 million people. You have the global newspaper that everyone reads, that everyone finds highly influential. There's also this Meta thing where it's like the newspaper. If you could see all the influential people reacting to the articles in the newspaper and then by virtue of reacting to it, making the thing more important. And anyone can post to it. Gets dictated from the timeline, how much venture rounds are done on the timeline, how much businesses are built on the timeline. Increasingly, everything will just become timeline native. TPBN is a great example of this. When we're recording this, every other day someone writes some sort of pornographic fanfic about AI and it moves the public markets dramatically. When there's uncertainty, people are just looking for what is the story, what is the most compelling story. And the way that it works on the timeline is it's not this well-considered book that comes out that everyone talks about for a year. It's what is the thing that sounds smart, feels good. It has to be entertaining. Maybe that's another change is a good post has to be very entertaining because people are on the timeline to be entertained. They can lie to themselves and say they're on it for other reasons, but it's just to be entertained. That's obviously what the algorithms are selecting for. There's this idea that the most entertaining, novel, somewhat interesting somewhat correct thing is going to set the actions and the consensus for everyone on a day-to-day basis. And this translates into their actions.”

“I think we are at peak guy. It's hard to say where to start this. There's a pagan understanding of God as being like in and around you everywhere. Everything is animated. Everything is controlled and dictated by the gods. And then in the Renaissance, you could say that God lives above the clouds, but there's like a guy up there that you can talk to. And then when we discover what's past the clouds, we go, okay, well, there's no guy up there. And then we discover space. And so basically you have to just keep going, well, okay, maybe he's beyond space. Maybe we don't know that it's a guy anymore that you could address and talk to, but it's this conceptual thing. God just sort of like moves farther and farther away and becomes more and more conceptual. But the idea is that ever since we've sort of become an atheist society, we've been looking for things to sort of look up to and worship. I think basically it's sort of trite now to say that like everyone has to worship or whatever. I think maybe like the more precise thing would be that there's always a role for a priest in society, and we've been looking for new priests. I think we tried scientists as priests. The scientific project has fallen apart a little bit. This is widely discussed. The idea that we looked to physics as hopefully going to provide us meaning— it hasn't. Physics has largely stalled since the war. We've moved beyond science as a source of meaning. There's this billionaire class that we sort of look to as the new sources of meaning. On its surface, it doesn't make a lot of sense that we would spend so much time caring about what billionaires think about whatever physics or theology or health or topics unrelated to accruing $1 billion? The reason we do, I think, is this is our new priestly class, which is we've said, okay, the values that are important in our society are being successful at business. And to be successful at business, you generally have to be smart and hardworking. These are the people that have ascended to the highest realm of piety in our value system. And so we're going to listen to them. We're willing to like take scientific and medical advice from people who are either in the billionaire class or are adjacent to the billionaire class, which is the poster class, which is the new class. I think the peak guy thing is this idea that there's basically been a lot of billionaire worship. Part of it is that they've gotten way less scarce. Billionaires have probably grown 100x in the last 20 years, probably more. We sort of look to them to provide us these answers and it has not been satisfying. And so this notion that I want to catch every podcast with this billionaire and I'm going to study his routines and habits and care about what he thinks about these things has sort of come to its full saturation. Money, I think we've just seen, is not as powerful as maybe it once was, or we think it is, insofar as certainly our political landscape. We have not seen the donor class be nearly as successful as they maybe used to be, or we thought they were. If you're a billionaire, you're sort of quite limited on the things that you can do vis-à-vis like an African warlord or a robber baron. There's these sort of like three forces of inflation driving down what it means to be a billionaire at all. And then the evolution of power structures in society are also limiting. Andrew Carnegie could take up arms against his workers, but now if you post the wrong thing as a billionaire, you have to resign. There's this sense that this whole class has just become less important. And then I also think just the media and podcasts It's just saturated. You get it, you understand this thing, but we don't want to take life advice. We don't want to hear about what's happening from the billionaire class anymore. And so that whole set just feels very saturated. It feels unlikely that there's a marginal billionaire that I'm going to learn something very interesting from on a podcast. And I don't think that was the case like 6 years ago. And so the logical question is, what is the next class as we sort of flail around looking for our next set of priests? I think it's the poster. I think you can see this because I think the billionaire class is a little bit deferential to the poster. One very clear way is the science class sort of inherited the priesthood after the actual priests. And then you can always look which class is subservient to the next to see who's next. The science class became subservient to the billionaire class. This is certainly the Epstein lesson, which is all the scientists are clamoring around the sort of money and glamour. Now I think the billionaire class has become subservient to the posting class. You can sort of see who society collectively chooses to be like, all right, this is the guy I want to listen to for 2 hours and base my life on.”

“I think we are at peak guy. It's hard to say where to start this. There's a pagan understanding of God as being like in and around you everywhere. Everything is animated. Everything is controlled and dictated by the gods. And then in the Renaissance, you could say that God lives above the clouds, but there's like a guy up there that you can talk to. And then when we discover what's past the clouds, we go, okay, well, there's no guy up there. And then we discover space. And so basically you have to just keep going, well, okay, maybe he's beyond space. Maybe we don't know that it's a guy anymore that you could address and talk to, but it's this conceptual thing. God just sort of like moves farther and farther away and becomes more and more conceptual. But the idea is that ever since we've sort of become an atheist society, we've been looking for things to sort of look up to and worship. I think basically it's sort of trite now to say that like everyone has to worship or whatever. I think maybe like the more precise thing would be that there's always a role for a priest in society, and we've been looking for new priests. I think we tried scientists as priests. The scientific project has fallen apart a little bit. This is widely discussed. The idea that we looked to physics as hopefully going to provide us meaning— it hasn't. Physics has largely stalled since the war. We've moved beyond science as a source of meaning. There's this billionaire class that we sort of look to as the new sources of meaning. On its surface, it doesn't make a lot of sense that we would spend so much time caring about what billionaires think about whatever physics or theology or health or topics unrelated to accruing $1 billion? The reason we do, I think, is this is our new priestly class, which is we've said, okay, the values that are important in our society are being successful at business. And to be successful at business, you generally have to be smart and hardworking. These are the people that have ascended to the highest realm of piety in our value system. And so we're going to listen to them. We're willing to like take scientific and medical advice from people who are either in the billionaire class or are adjacent to the billionaire class, which is the poster class, which is the new class. I think the peak guy thing is this idea that there's basically been a lot of billionaire worship. Part of it is that they've gotten way less scarce. Billionaires have probably grown 100x in the last 20 years, probably more. We sort of look to them to provide us these answers and it has not been satisfying. And so this notion that I want to catch every podcast with this billionaire and I'm going to study his routines and habits and care about what he thinks about these things has sort of come to its full saturation. Money, I think we've just seen, is not as powerful as maybe it once was, or we think it is, insofar as certainly our political landscape. We have not seen the donor class be nearly as successful as they maybe used to be, or we thought they were. If you're a billionaire, you're sort of quite limited on the things that you can do vis-à-vis like an African warlord or a robber baron. There's these sort of like three forces of inflation driving down what it means to be a billionaire at all. And then the evolution of power structures in society are also limiting. Andrew Carnegie could take up arms against his workers, but now if you post the wrong thing as a billionaire, you have to resign. There's this sense that this whole class has just become less important. And then I also think just the media and podcasts It's just saturated. You get it, you understand this thing, but we don't want to take life advice. We don't want to hear about what's happening from the billionaire class anymore. And so that whole set just feels very saturated. It feels unlikely that there's a marginal billionaire that I'm going to learn something very interesting from on a podcast. And I don't think that was the case like 6 years ago. And so the logical question is, what is the next class as we sort of flail around looking for our next set of priests? I think it's the poster. I think you can see this because I think the billionaire class is a little bit deferential to the poster. One very clear way is the science class sort of inherited the priesthood after the actual priests. And then you can always look which class is subservient to the next to see who's next. The science class became subservient to the billionaire class. This is certainly the Epstein lesson, which is all the scientists are clamoring around the sort of money and glamour. Now I think the billionaire class has become subservient to the posting class. You can sort of see who society collectively chooses to be like, all right, this is the guy I want to listen to for 2 hours and base my life on.”

“I think we are at peak guy. It's hard to say where to start this. There's a pagan understanding of God as being like in and around you everywhere. Everything is animated. Everything is controlled and dictated by the gods. And then in the Renaissance, you could say that God lives above the clouds, but there's like a guy up there that you can talk to. And then when we discover what's past the clouds, we go, okay, well, there's no guy up there. And then we discover space. And so basically you have to just keep going, well, okay, maybe he's beyond space. Maybe we don't know that it's a guy anymore that you could address and talk to, but it's this conceptual thing. God just sort of like moves farther and farther away and becomes more and more conceptual. But the idea is that ever since we've sort of become an atheist society, we've been looking for things to sort of look up to and worship. I think basically it's sort of trite now to say that like everyone has to worship or whatever. I think maybe like the more precise thing would be that there's always a role for a priest in society, and we've been looking for new priests. I think we tried scientists as priests. The scientific project has fallen apart a little bit. This is widely discussed. The idea that we looked to physics as hopefully going to provide us meaning— it hasn't. Physics has largely stalled since the war. We've moved beyond science as a source of meaning. There's this billionaire class that we sort of look to as the new sources of meaning. On its surface, it doesn't make a lot of sense that we would spend so much time caring about what billionaires think about whatever physics or theology or health or topics unrelated to accruing $1 billion? The reason we do, I think, is this is our new priestly class, which is we've said, okay, the values that are important in our society are being successful at business. And to be successful at business, you generally have to be smart and hardworking. These are the people that have ascended to the highest realm of piety in our value system. And so we're going to listen to them. We're willing to like take scientific and medical advice from people who are either in the billionaire class or are adjacent to the billionaire class, which is the poster class, which is the new class. I think the peak guy thing is this idea that there's basically been a lot of billionaire worship. Part of it is that they've gotten way less scarce. Billionaires have probably grown 100x in the last 20 years, probably more. We sort of look to them to provide us these answers and it has not been satisfying. And so this notion that I want to catch every podcast with this billionaire and I'm going to study his routines and habits and care about what he thinks about these things has sort of come to its full saturation. Money, I think we've just seen, is not as powerful as maybe it once was, or we think it is, insofar as certainly our political landscape. We have not seen the donor class be nearly as successful as they maybe used to be, or we thought they were. If you're a billionaire, you're sort of quite limited on the things that you can do vis-à-vis like an African warlord or a robber baron. There's these sort of like three forces of inflation driving down what it means to be a billionaire at all. And then the evolution of power structures in society are also limiting. Andrew Carnegie could take up arms against his workers, but now if you post the wrong thing as a billionaire, you have to resign. There's this sense that this whole class has just become less important. And then I also think just the media and podcasts It's just saturated. You get it, you understand this thing, but we don't want to take life advice. We don't want to hear about what's happening from the billionaire class anymore. And so that whole set just feels very saturated. It feels unlikely that there's a marginal billionaire that I'm going to learn something very interesting from on a podcast. And I don't think that was the case like 6 years ago. And so the logical question is, what is the next class as we sort of flail around looking for our next set of priests? I think it's the poster. I think you can see this because I think the billionaire class is a little bit deferential to the poster. One very clear way is the science class sort of inherited the priesthood after the actual priests. And then you can always look which class is subservient to the next to see who's next. The science class became subservient to the billionaire class. This is certainly the Epstein lesson, which is all the scientists are clamoring around the sort of money and glamour. Now I think the billionaire class has become subservient to the posting class. You can sort of see who society collectively chooses to be like, all right, this is the guy I want to listen to for 2 hours and base my life on.”

“Yeah. And it used to carry the same weight as billionaire, but now millionaires, both are relevant. When you say someone's a millionaire, you're sort of just saying they're like an upper middle class, well-to-do person with a house. It doesn't matter if they have $5 million or $800,000. It's this loser class thing. As currency gets devalued, both in terms of the literal sense and also in the sort of what you can do with it sense, time is fixed. The new scarcity is just like attention you can draw on the screen.”

“The distinction to draw is the people that I want to get tweet notifications for because I actually think each one of their posts is really good. And that's like a vanishingly small number. And then there are good posters who are just people who have really made something of themselves because of their prolificness. The other sort of problem with posting is like it still does reward prolificness, which I am still sternly against. I always think Twitter should be dictated by followers divided by posts. Followers per post, but that's not how it works. It just rewards prolificness. I think there's this idea that the most important media property won't be watched. The most important author isn't read. The most important philosopher is not understood. The most important stock has no fundamentals. In a world of fiat currency, everything sort of becomes this weird fiat thing. Certainly it's true about philosophers, authors. Does anyone really read the books these authors write? I don't think so. I think a small amount of tastemakers read the books and then other people look at books as sort of titles, and if they're blessed by the right people, then there's sort of this like memetic celebration of the thing. And even podcast clips do a lot better than the podcast episode. I pride myself, I can tell if a podcast or a blog essay or a book or something is good or not without having read it just by triangulating it. I know which one of your episodes do well without listening to them because I can sort of feel from the reception. To some extent, that is the thing. You can imagine a world where there's a few clips from a podcast, but no one ever listens to the podcast. I don't actually think that would diminish the value of the property.”

“Buffett and Munger were my kind of main teachers on investing. Buffett says that he wants his estate outside of Berkshire to be put in the S&P. That's his advice to the general public. People take that to say that Buffett's saying you can't beat the market. I don't think that's what he's saying. I think he's saying for the average person, you shouldn't try and beat the market. Implicit in that statement is leaving out any sort of active investor. Maybe the anecdotal side would be Buffett saying you should put all your money into the S&P. That's the most rational thing you should do. On the other side is the sort of empirical argument, which is, look, most professionals don't even beat the market after fees. This is this one-two punch of the godfather of investing says Don't try. Seemingly the smartest people with the best incentives in the world can't do it. And then the other thing is I just think that for a professional money manager, and this is sort of the paradox with the Buffett thing, is that for a professional money manager, it is really hard to beat the market because you have all these other factors that the average person doesn't have. And this is the Peter Lynch argument. I increasingly think Peter Lynch was kind of a genius about this, which is that like, yeah, when you're a professional manager, by and large, you have all these mandates, you're running a business, you have customers that you need to keep happy. It's more difficult for the professional money manager to beat the market than like the average amateur. How many people do you know who like bought Bitcoin and did really well, or bought a Tesla and then they bought the Tesla stock, or they bought an Apple computer and they bought the Apple stock? You can't run a hedge fund that way, but they've outperformed just doing that. And so I think there's a little bit of this like weird thing where in isolation, none of the advice is wrong, It's not as difficult as people think to, I think, outperform or do better than the average. And there's this notion that gets caught up in all sorts of other things that I think sort of sullies that view.”

“someone who's worth $100 million with a $10 billion fund. It's just a big scary thing. And I don't care who you are, when you're taking bets that are an order of magnitude larger than any amount of money you've ever had, there's just a psychological factor there versus when you're taking bets that are maybe sort of negligible to you. Part of the reason I think it's easier for people to outperform individuals is it's easy to take a flyer on a stock with a marginal fraction of your net worth that you don't feel you need to explain and you're not going to be judged on later than it is to do with maybe a dollar amount that's more money than you have. Going to affect your track record and you're going to have to explain it and all these other factors that are not related to like Do you think this is a good investment or not?”

“I really do think people value complexity for the sake of complexity a lot. I think a lot of investors are in the like feel clever, look smart game more than the money game. Personally, I think this has been a big area of self-development for me, which is the clever thing is not always the thing that makes money, obviously. You either have to say, I am looking for investment ideas that are so complex that no one is going to do them, or it should actually be quite simple. I'm a bigger and bigger believer in the simplicity, which is you probably want to be long Elon Musk. That level of idea, I actually think the gift is being able to sell that idea and maybe even dress up the— I think a lot of the investing media actually serves for the people who are really good to dress up those ideas in a way that makes them feel differentiated and smart enough to what is actually sort of long Elon or long Bitcoin. I think of a guy that I know who exclusively does bankruptcies and he makes a lot of money. That's very complex and very difficult, but it's a tremendous amount of work. It's grimy, it's difficult. There's a lot of risk and personal stuff. And that to me is like an example of getting paid for complexity. Whereas a good example of simplicity is you should just buy big companies when they're at their 200-week moving average. I love that idea because it's just so simple, but it's right. One story that I absolutely love cutting through the mess and getting to like complete clarity on how to evaluate an investment is from Richard Rainwater, which is— there's these stories about him that he would basically come into his office with a yellow legal pad. And you would write out your thesis on one page and then you would tell him what percentage of your net worth you're going to put in the deal. And based on your one-page thesis and the percentage of the net worth that was going to put in, he would say yes or no. And I think that's genius. People don't do that because that's really hard. It makes things way harder. First of all, it's hard to write a compelling thesis in a page. It's much easier to do it in a 400-page slide deck. And second of all, no one wants to say, well, I'm only putting 3% of my net worth in this. To me, that's one of the most simple clear examples of really cutting to, is this a good investment or not, that I've ever heard.”

“It's probably similar to how I look at everything, but I think especially for an emerging manager, when you're truly just sort of underwriting the person, people still fail. They probably overweight the investing thesis and track record and stuff and underweight facts about the person. I think you and I are both big believers in the idea of how you do one thing is how you do everything. And so the personal financial situation of a manager is an incredibly underrated thing to ask about. If you have a couple hundred million dollars in the bank account and you're raising a $30 million fund, that's very different than someone who has a million dollars in the bank who's raising $100 million to go do a thing that they're trying to make the most money from. There's like two very different places to start from underwriting. One notion I have about this is whether someone is looking up or looking down at something, and the idea is take the same two $50 million funds. One is from someone who has $500 grand in the bank and one is from someone who has $500 million in the bank. Those are just like obviously going to be treated very, very differently. For the latter, for the $500 million person, the $50 million fund might very well do better because it's held with a looser grip. It's less on the line. You're going to be less paralyzed by the sheer like quantities of dollars. That is generally not super recognized and you see it all the time, like in new ventures. If you are helming something that is 2 or 3 zeros more than you have, there's just a sort of monumentalness to it that is a bit intimidating. You can scale this all the way up.”

“We're very fortunate to have such a wide mandate and sort of what we can do and look at. Maybe the only consensus view is the niche sort of apocalyptic vision at some of the core zealots at the labs. But outside of that, I think it's really sort of a jump ball. Markets lack a lot of nuance. SaaS is a business model of this idea that you pay usually per person, per month or per year for access to a tool that helps you use your computer. I think in that sense, SaaS is in a lot of trouble, but I don't think for a lot of these businesses that are being really sold off today out of fear that that is actually what is important to the business at all. It is actually interesting to me. I wrote a post recently about the idea that a public manager being long the Mag 7 is, without taking a specific view on the trade, probably like good capital allocation because sometimes you just got to do the really obvious thing and just follow consensus because consensus is Usually, right? One of the pushbacks that I got to that is, well, these things, you know, they're the biggest companies in the world, they're priced to perfection. I think it's underrated the fact that the 52-week variance on these things is like nearly 100% for the biggest companies in the world. And so they're not priced well at all, and the market lacks extreme nuance. I think it goes back to what we were talking about, which is probably someone smarter than me could draw out a much clearer picture, but there's something to do with passive flows and the marginal price of security. And what's informing the marginal price of securities is the posts in the group chats that the random people are writing, that the algorithm's chosen. In this way, the algorithm, the AI, frankly, my understanding is that's what's driving most of the algorithms now on Twitter and YouTube is pricing the market in some very real sense because it's choosing the narrative that it wants to show to people. And then those people are pricing off that. It's another lesson, which is markets are not efficient. There's no nuance. That would be the big thing that we're seeing today. I think there's a lot of delusion in either direction. The most honest thing for a lot of managers to do would be to sit it out, but they're structurally unable or unwilling to do that. And so you just sort of, you know, hope for the best and put capital out the door, and it's sort of a problem for tomorrow. A lot of things are still getting priced irrationally in the private markets in ways that are totally unrelated to the quality of the business, but are more of a function of just the incentive structures of the funds.”

“I'm interested in mispricings in qualities and attributes about things and people and places. I don't know if this has always been true, but it's true today. I think there's some qualities and attributes that are widely recognized and priced efficiently, let's say height, IQ, resume, and then there's other traits and characteristics that we have just decided collectively not to price. For Silicon Valley, people sort of underrate the philosophers and thinkers and memetic ideas that underpin the whole thing. I think there is a real philosophy that's some sort of like Neo-Buddhist utilitarianism that underlies the technological developments in Silicon Valley. It's interesting because you see it like Will MacAskill gets involved with SBF and FTX. There's these sort of thinkers like Nick Land, Their sort of ideas percolate underneath the surface in the Valley and are influential in everyone, but are not necessarily named. I mean, now they have been. You could say the same thing about Curtis Yarvin. I thought it was remarkable for years how you could sort of hear Curtis's ideas coming out of the mouth of the big tech leaders without being named. There's things like Leverage Research and all these intellectual characters that I think people's religious beliefs are generally underrated by secular people in terms of how important that is as a guiding light. In the Valley, in the development of these technologies, these sorts of cultural and philosophical ideas are underrated. Like it or not, the models are highly utilitarian. They have this weird mix of religious ideas from Judaism, from Buddhism, this sort of like utilitarian bent that turns into effective altruism. And people sort of think this is just cultural, whatever, but these things matter. And it just feels to me that this whole cultural epicenter has been highly underrated in general and informing why these things get built and what the worldviews inherent in them are and what the inherent worldviews are in the people who build them. It almost feels to me that Wall Street in the '80s was sort of this vain, almost pagan, the strong and the beautiful are what's most important. There's a hedonistic aspect to it. There's an openness that it's a little bit nihilist because it's all just about getting money. There's not the same notion. And I think at the crux of that is that technology views itself as totally self-righteous, which is that the thing that they are building, it's not nakedly sin-driven or driven out of a greed or ambition. It's driven out of this nominally altruistic idea of, no, we're building this thing, this product that the whole world uses. It's positive sum, which is true on the surface, but I do think that it's almost pathological at the point where there's no recognition all the other factors. It's almost sort of shadow-esque. And there's none of this notion of like, well, if you work in finance, you sort of need to translate the gains from finance into something worthy, into art, into architecture, into philanthropy, into just culture in general, or into the place that you live. None of that exists because I think tech views itself as the ultimate philanthropy is the business that you're building. I don't think Silicon Valley today has the same sort of reflexive need to justify or document or even launder what they're doing through going to book parties and arts and all this stuff. And I think it's like this interesting difference. And I wish that more people would try and document this stuff because it's all there. All the crazy, all the sex, drugs, and rock and roll is there in its own nerdy autistic way. Again, I think culture is just like vastly underrated and religious beliefs, whether literally religious or pseudo-religious, but filling that void.”

“I'm interested in mispricings in qualities and attributes about things and people and places. I don't know if this has always been true, but it's true today. I think there's some qualities and attributes that are widely recognized and priced efficiently, let's say height, IQ, resume, and then there's other traits and characteristics that we have just decided collectively not to price. For Silicon Valley, people sort of underrate the philosophers and thinkers and memetic ideas that underpin the whole thing. I think there is a real philosophy that's some sort of like Neo-Buddhist utilitarianism that underlies the technological developments in Silicon Valley. It's interesting because you see it like Will MacAskill gets involved with SBF and FTX. There's these sort of thinkers like Nick Land, Their sort of ideas percolate underneath the surface in the Valley and are influential in everyone, but are not necessarily named. I mean, now they have been. You could say the same thing about Curtis Yarvin. I thought it was remarkable for years how you could sort of hear Curtis's ideas coming out of the mouth of the big tech leaders without being named. There's things like Leverage Research and all these intellectual characters that I think people's religious beliefs are generally underrated by secular people in terms of how important that is as a guiding light. In the Valley, in the development of these technologies, these sorts of cultural and philosophical ideas are underrated. Like it or not, the models are highly utilitarian. They have this weird mix of religious ideas from Judaism, from Buddhism, this sort of like utilitarian bent that turns into effective altruism. And people sort of think this is just cultural, whatever, but these things matter. And it just feels to me that this whole cultural epicenter has been highly underrated in general and informing why these things get built and what the worldviews inherent in them are and what the inherent worldviews are in the people who build them. It almost feels to me that Wall Street in the '80s was sort of this vain, almost pagan, the strong and the beautiful are what's most important. There's a hedonistic aspect to it. There's an openness that it's a little bit nihilist because it's all just about getting money. There's not the same notion. And I think at the crux of that is that technology views itself as totally self-righteous, which is that the thing that they are building, it's not nakedly sin-driven or driven out of a greed or ambition. It's driven out of this nominally altruistic idea of, no, we're building this thing, this product that the whole world uses. It's positive sum, which is true on the surface, but I do think that it's almost pathological at the point where there's no recognition all the other factors. It's almost sort of shadow-esque. And there's none of this notion of like, well, if you work in finance, you sort of need to translate the gains from finance into something worthy, into art, into architecture, into philanthropy, into just culture in general, or into the place that you live. None of that exists because I think tech views itself as the ultimate philanthropy is the business that you're building. I don't think Silicon Valley today has the same sort of reflexive need to justify or document or even launder what they're doing through going to book parties and arts and all this stuff. And I think it's like this interesting difference. And I wish that more people would try and document this stuff because it's all there. All the crazy, all the sex, drugs, and rock and roll is there in its own nerdy autistic way. Again, I think culture is just like vastly underrated and religious beliefs, whether literally religious or pseudo-religious, but filling that void.”

“I'm interested in mispricings in qualities and attributes about things and people and places. I don't know if this has always been true, but it's true today. I think there's some qualities and attributes that are widely recognized and priced efficiently, let's say height, IQ, resume, and then there's other traits and characteristics that we have just decided collectively not to price. For Silicon Valley, people sort of underrate the philosophers and thinkers and memetic ideas that underpin the whole thing. I think there is a real philosophy that's some sort of like Neo-Buddhist utilitarianism that underlies the technological developments in Silicon Valley. It's interesting because you see it like Will MacAskill gets involved with SBF and FTX. There's these sort of thinkers like Nick Land, Their sort of ideas percolate underneath the surface in the Valley and are influential in everyone, but are not necessarily named. I mean, now they have been. You could say the same thing about Curtis Yarvin. I thought it was remarkable for years how you could sort of hear Curtis's ideas coming out of the mouth of the big tech leaders without being named. There's things like Leverage Research and all these intellectual characters that I think people's religious beliefs are generally underrated by secular people in terms of how important that is as a guiding light. In the Valley, in the development of these technologies, these sorts of cultural and philosophical ideas are underrated. Like it or not, the models are highly utilitarian. They have this weird mix of religious ideas from Judaism, from Buddhism, this sort of like utilitarian bent that turns into effective altruism. And people sort of think this is just cultural, whatever, but these things matter. And it just feels to me that this whole cultural epicenter has been highly underrated in general and informing why these things get built and what the worldviews inherent in them are and what the inherent worldviews are in the people who build them. It almost feels to me that Wall Street in the '80s was sort of this vain, almost pagan, the strong and the beautiful are what's most important. There's a hedonistic aspect to it. There's an openness that it's a little bit nihilist because it's all just about getting money. There's not the same notion. And I think at the crux of that is that technology views itself as totally self-righteous, which is that the thing that they are building, it's not nakedly sin-driven or driven out of a greed or ambition. It's driven out of this nominally altruistic idea of, no, we're building this thing, this product that the whole world uses. It's positive sum, which is true on the surface, but I do think that it's almost pathological at the point where there's no recognition all the other factors. It's almost sort of shadow-esque. And there's none of this notion of like, well, if you work in finance, you sort of need to translate the gains from finance into something worthy, into art, into architecture, into philanthropy, into just culture in general, or into the place that you live. None of that exists because I think tech views itself as the ultimate philanthropy is the business that you're building. I don't think Silicon Valley today has the same sort of reflexive need to justify or document or even launder what they're doing through going to book parties and arts and all this stuff. And I think it's like this interesting difference. And I wish that more people would try and document this stuff because it's all there. All the crazy, all the sex, drugs, and rock and roll is there in its own nerdy autistic way. Again, I think culture is just like vastly underrated and religious beliefs, whether literally religious or pseudo-religious, but filling that void.”

“I'm interested in mispricings in qualities and attributes about things and people and places. I don't know if this has always been true, but it's true today. I think there's some qualities and attributes that are widely recognized and priced efficiently, let's say height, IQ, resume, and then there's other traits and characteristics that we have just decided collectively not to price. For Silicon Valley, people sort of underrate the philosophers and thinkers and memetic ideas that underpin the whole thing. I think there is a real philosophy that's some sort of like Neo-Buddhist utilitarianism that underlies the technological developments in Silicon Valley. It's interesting because you see it like Will MacAskill gets involved with SBF and FTX. There's these sort of thinkers like Nick Land, Their sort of ideas percolate underneath the surface in the Valley and are influential in everyone, but are not necessarily named. I mean, now they have been. You could say the same thing about Curtis Yarvin. I thought it was remarkable for years how you could sort of hear Curtis's ideas coming out of the mouth of the big tech leaders without being named. There's things like Leverage Research and all these intellectual characters that I think people's religious beliefs are generally underrated by secular people in terms of how important that is as a guiding light. In the Valley, in the development of these technologies, these sorts of cultural and philosophical ideas are underrated. Like it or not, the models are highly utilitarian. They have this weird mix of religious ideas from Judaism, from Buddhism, this sort of like utilitarian bent that turns into effective altruism. And people sort of think this is just cultural, whatever, but these things matter. And it just feels to me that this whole cultural epicenter has been highly underrated in general and informing why these things get built and what the worldviews inherent in them are and what the inherent worldviews are in the people who build them. It almost feels to me that Wall Street in the '80s was sort of this vain, almost pagan, the strong and the beautiful are what's most important. There's a hedonistic aspect to it. There's an openness that it's a little bit nihilist because it's all just about getting money. There's not the same notion. And I think at the crux of that is that technology views itself as totally self-righteous, which is that the thing that they are building, it's not nakedly sin-driven or driven out of a greed or ambition. It's driven out of this nominally altruistic idea of, no, we're building this thing, this product that the whole world uses. It's positive sum, which is true on the surface, but I do think that it's almost pathological at the point where there's no recognition all the other factors. It's almost sort of shadow-esque. And there's none of this notion of like, well, if you work in finance, you sort of need to translate the gains from finance into something worthy, into art, into architecture, into philanthropy, into just culture in general, or into the place that you live. None of that exists because I think tech views itself as the ultimate philanthropy is the business that you're building. I don't think Silicon Valley today has the same sort of reflexive need to justify or document or even launder what they're doing through going to book parties and arts and all this stuff. And I think it's like this interesting difference. And I wish that more people would try and document this stuff because it's all there. All the crazy, all the sex, drugs, and rock and roll is there in its own nerdy autistic way. Again, I think culture is just like vastly underrated and religious beliefs, whether literally religious or pseudo-religious, but filling that void.”

“The short to medium-term prognosis is hard to speculate on and could very well be bad. A friend of mine, he has kids in college and he has a 10-year-old and he's very worried about the kids in college, but not the 10-year-old. And I think that is directionally correct. Maybe from the 10-year-old's perspective, look, I think it's great. I think first of all, Anything that can be automated should be automated. I think it's really hard to argue against that when you really, really think about it. The notion to me that I might be in the last years of my life where I ever have to sit down in front of a computer and like do things with it is tremendously liberating. On the jobs thing, I don't really understand this idea of we're at peak jobs or we're going to run out of jobs. To me, it's very obvious that every white-collar job is like totally fake and made up in the sense that these are not contingent for shelter and food and medicine and other necessities. Like, I'm not talking about those, but most jobs do not touch those, or if they do, they touch it in a very, very derivative way. What is your job as an allocator? Well, because capital is inherently inflationary, you can't just leave it alone. This is one of like the great, maybe evils of money is that once you get it, you can't just leave it alone because then it goes away. So you have to do something with it. And this creates this entire whole thing. My job is when you have money and you don't want it to go away, you have to give it to someone. You give it to a bunch of people. I take it and I put it into things that are productive. And then hopefully you don't lose your money. You get more money. Is this useful? Is this good? Yeah, sure. It's not real and it's like fun and useful, but not in a direct way. To me, there's like unlimited amounts of jobs that you can create in those sorts of scenarios. We're going to have unlimited wants and desires, and our economy is solely driven by our unquenchable desire to consume things. So we're going to come up with new things to consume. And now again, in the short term and medium term, that might be volatile and there might be a lot of job loss and that's not good. And there could be a lot of despair. In the long run, we're just going to invent new things to do. We've already solved all of our problems. The worry about, oh, we're not going to have more jobs, it just doesn't really resonate. We just make up stuff for us to do, and that's sort of the whole point of it. And that's good. That's better than being idle. Maybe more people should be idle. There's all sorts of ways that this shows through the cracks. The work from home thing, I think, is like a strong indication of most people don't have 40 hours of work to be done. They maybe have 40 hours of meetings to sit in, or they have 40 hours that they have to be on standby. Work from home, I think, wouldn't be that important. Let's imagine a version where you work on a factory line and you can set up the microcosm of the factory in your backyard., but you still got to be on the line 10 hours a day. Yeah, I guess work from home, maybe you can have lunch at home. You don't have a commute anymore, but it's not like this huge improvement. The reason people are so attached to work from home is because they actually have like 2 or 3 hours of work to do per day. And there's a lot of your time at the office where you're just sort of like killing time. Yeah. And so work from home Fridays is a soft launch of the 4-day work week. And I think this is all fine. The fact that we can continue paying people to work from home and work 4 days a week is just a sign that we need less labor time out of people than we used to, and we're still able be just as productive.”

“The short to medium-term prognosis is hard to speculate on and could very well be bad. A friend of mine, he has kids in college and he has a 10-year-old and he's very worried about the kids in college, but not the 10-year-old. And I think that is directionally correct. Maybe from the 10-year-old's perspective, look, I think it's great. I think first of all, Anything that can be automated should be automated. I think it's really hard to argue against that when you really, really think about it. The notion to me that I might be in the last years of my life where I ever have to sit down in front of a computer and like do things with it is tremendously liberating. On the jobs thing, I don't really understand this idea of we're at peak jobs or we're going to run out of jobs. To me, it's very obvious that every white-collar job is like totally fake and made up in the sense that these are not contingent for shelter and food and medicine and other necessities. Like, I'm not talking about those, but most jobs do not touch those, or if they do, they touch it in a very, very derivative way. What is your job as an allocator? Well, because capital is inherently inflationary, you can't just leave it alone. This is one of like the great, maybe evils of money is that once you get it, you can't just leave it alone because then it goes away. So you have to do something with it. And this creates this entire whole thing. My job is when you have money and you don't want it to go away, you have to give it to someone. You give it to a bunch of people. I take it and I put it into things that are productive. And then hopefully you don't lose your money. You get more money. Is this useful? Is this good? Yeah, sure. It's not real and it's like fun and useful, but not in a direct way. To me, there's like unlimited amounts of jobs that you can create in those sorts of scenarios. We're going to have unlimited wants and desires, and our economy is solely driven by our unquenchable desire to consume things. So we're going to come up with new things to consume. And now again, in the short term and medium term, that might be volatile and there might be a lot of job loss and that's not good. And there could be a lot of despair. In the long run, we're just going to invent new things to do. We've already solved all of our problems. The worry about, oh, we're not going to have more jobs, it just doesn't really resonate. We just make up stuff for us to do, and that's sort of the whole point of it. And that's good. That's better than being idle. Maybe more people should be idle. There's all sorts of ways that this shows through the cracks. The work from home thing, I think, is like a strong indication of most people don't have 40 hours of work to be done. They maybe have 40 hours of meetings to sit in, or they have 40 hours that they have to be on standby. Work from home, I think, wouldn't be that important. Let's imagine a version where you work on a factory line and you can set up the microcosm of the factory in your backyard., but you still got to be on the line 10 hours a day. Yeah, I guess work from home, maybe you can have lunch at home. You don't have a commute anymore, but it's not like this huge improvement. The reason people are so attached to work from home is because they actually have like 2 or 3 hours of work to do per day. And there's a lot of your time at the office where you're just sort of like killing time. Yeah. And so work from home Fridays is a soft launch of the 4-day work week. And I think this is all fine. The fact that we can continue paying people to work from home and work 4 days a week is just a sign that we need less labor time out of people than we used to, and we're still able be just as productive.”

“I think my takeaway from that would simply be that one should not fool themselves that they are looking for anything other than entertainment in all the media that they consume. It is produced to be entertaining. It's selected to be entertaining. It's edited to be entertaining. The job to be done of what is on the screen is to entertain you. I think that is the big lesson. I'm not going to tell people how much entertainment they should have in their life. But that is what it is fundamentally. Rolex or Nike can convince you that their thing is an investment or an asset versus a liability, then you'll spend way more money on it. Podcasts and posts and essays can convince you that what you're reading is useful for you and productive and anything other than watching TV all day. Whether I want to spend an hour a day on the timeline or 8 hours a day on the timeline, it's just about like, how much do I want to be entertained? You don't really miss anything. If you're not like a complete hermit, you hear about what's important. Probably the most like enlightened way to consume this media is to not read it yourself. Get the filtered takes from people around you at dinners and lunches and stuff. And you just let them, first of all, expose themselves to the radiation and then come back and tell you what's interesting or not on there.”

“I hear a lot of lamentation over the death of books. People don't read anymore. And it's so interesting to me because I've read a lot of books. I like books. I've spent a good portion of my life reading books. I don't see the big crisis that everyone laments about with books. I mean, the attention span thing maybe is true. Like, it's certainly way harder for me to read a book just on a pure focus, but I feel like the sum total of the interviews that I listen to and the things that I read and all this stuff are great. I don't think I don't have an appetite for books just because they're harder to read. I think I'm like feeling nourished from the other sources. If you think about porn, it's like more obviously bad because people don't have sex and they watch porn and it's fairly straightforward that sex is better than porn. And that seems like an obvious thing. People will hold that up right next to books. And to me, the book thing feels a little bit like a swan song for a technology that there will still be a place for. It was the best way we had of delivering information, and now there's new ways, and they're more compelling and more interesting. You have to caveat that, of course, with— I'm very sensitive to language and the terms that we use. Terminally online, brain rot. We recognize these are terms of death and rotting and destruction and very negative nihilistic terms. You do have to balance that with— we didn't pick neutral or positive terms for these activities. And I don't think anyone ever would self-conceive of reading a lot of books as being this like very negative thing. The counterargument would be that we have this deep sense that it is bad. Maybe like everything, it's just less forgiving. If you're highly disciplined and motivated, the way that you can use new media is better than ever. But if you're not, then it's just going to be worse than ever. It's just going to be really tough.”

“I certainly care about productivity. For me, by far the most generative thing is Conversations, which I guess are downstream of relationships. Part of the reason my book reading has gone down is I'm friends with a lot of people that read a lot of books. If I could only keep one thing, it would be conversations with people that I find interesting. But I also think like I'm uniquely tolerant of distasteful and weird people. I get asked a fair amount like, what's your media diet? And conversations are my answer. And it always feels like the answer falls flat with people. And I think it's because they're not friends with like weirdos. A lot of my friends I think are sort of people would largely find strange at best, distasteful at worst. If I can't predict what the person's going to say after knowing them for a while, I like them a lot. And that's a very high variance thing. Old books are good. I think YouTube remains underrated. There's a lot of really obscure things on YouTube that I really enjoy listening to. YouTube sort of remains the Library of Alexandria of our time, maybe of ever. But yeah, YouTube doesn't feel generative. I think the only thing that's generative is conversations. So far in early 2026, I would say chatbots can lull you into feeling generative. But if I actually look at the actions that I've taken, you can feel really productive after a good 2-hour session on a chatbot, but I actually don't think they're that generative.”

“One of the, I think, natural points of leverage now is the ability to hire extraordinarily well, which means two things: attract an amazing differentiated talent pool and then select from that group effectively. That's something that you thought a ton about in building your business, and it seems like a skill that if you got good at it, would be unbelievably valuable in this era specifically where the returns to like outlier talent seem to be going up and up and up. What did you learn about the two stages of that process? I'm especially interested in attracting a unique pool of talent in the first place.”